Table of Contents

Deterrence
Prevention
Preemption
Crisis Management
Consequence Management
Attribution
Retaliation
Terrorism

 

Deterrence:

• Institute preferred definition: The use of explicit or implicit threats to prevent an enemy from taking action. Achieving this requires convincing the enemy that he will face unacceptable punishment or denial of his objectives.
• JCS Pub 1-02 definition: The prevention of action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of threat of unacceptable counteraction.

Institute comment: Deterrence does not have to involve military force or the threat of force.

Prevention:

• Institute preferred definition: Defensive actions taken by the public and private sector to prevent attacks and planning to mitigate the effects of those attacks.
• JCS Pub 1-02 definition: The security procedures undertaken by the public and private sector to discourage terrorist acts.
  — Antiterrorism: Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces. Also called AT.
  —Counterterrorism: Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Also called CT.

Institute comment: The JCS definition applies strictly to military issues; ANSER recommends the language be broadened for the Homeland Security context. Prevention may apply to acts other than terrorist acts, and may involve a host of measures not normally considered "security measures," by agencies not normally considered "security agencies." (Example: Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control, etc.)

A key point is the fact that Prevention involves active, concrete purely defensive measures such as arms control, airport security, and missile defense.

The JCS definition, designed for purely military use, does not draw a distinction between defensive measures and offensive measures. ANSER does propose such a distinction, because these two strategic functions involve quite different federal agencies.

Prevention must take into account both what we want to prevent, and the alternative outcome we are likely to cause as a result.

Preemption:

• Institute preferred definition: Acting first to eliminate an opponent's imminent ability to take a specific action

Institute comment: Preemption requires strong specific proof of both intent and capability. Without strong proof of imminent action, preemption is indistinguishable from aggression.

Crisis Management:

• Institute preferred definition: Measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism. The laws of the United States assign primary authority to the Federal Government to prevent and respond to acts of terrorism; State and local governments provide assistance as required. Crisis management is -predominantly a law enforcement response. Based on the situation, a Federal crisis management response may be supported by technical operations, and by Federal consequence management, which may operate concurrently. (provided by Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39), United States Policy on Counterterrorism)

Institute Comment Not every bad situation is a crisis. The term crisis implies an out-of-the-ordinary specific threat or specific event with national level consequences.

Consequence Management:

• Institute preferred definition: Measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism. The laws of the United States assign primary authority to the States to respond to the consequences of terrorism; the Federal Government provides assistance as required. (provided by Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39), United States Policy on Counterterrorism)

Institute Comment Consequence Management is separate from but overlaps with Crisis Management. Undesirable consequences, which must be managed, minimized, or eliminated, begin when the crisis begins, and may last long after the crisis is resolved.

Attribution:

• Institute preferred definition: Identifying the perpetrator of a specific act with the certainty required to allow for counter-action. Certainty may be established based on forensic evidence and other forms of credible intelligence..
  

Institute Comment: Attribution may be public or remain classified depending upon the effect desired. But the fact that attributions held in secret will probably be made public at some point has serious policy implications and should be considered when a determination to pursue attribution is made.

Retaliation:

• Institute preferred definition: Action taken against the perpetrator of a hostile act for the purpose of preempting or deterring further hostile acts. The promise of effective crisis management and consequence management to deny an aggressor the desired effects of attack, together with the promise of effective attribution and retaliation to punish the attack itself contributes directly to deterrence.

Institute comment: Retaliation is not reprisal. It is conducted with legal means and has a strategic end beyond punishment (often including the elimination of an adversarial capability) and servers to deter future attacks.

Additional definitions for consideration:

Terrorism:

• Institute preferred definition: The calculated use of violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. (provided by JCS Pub 1-02) Note: The terrorists may be either state or non-state actors.

-Randy Larsen is the Director of the ANSER Institute for Homeland Security. Dave McIntyre is the Deputy Director for Research. Mark DeMier is the Institute's Deputy Director for Operations. Comments should be directed to 703-416-3597.