Joshua Sinai is a senior policy analyst in the Intelligence Division at ANSER, in Shirlington, VA. He is a specialist on international strategic and security issues; his professional work focuses on assessing terrorism in all its dimensions—the origins of terrorism, terrorist group profiles, developing indications and warning methodologies to forecast terrorist warfare (particularly the paths, links, and processes involved in the transition by terrorist groups from conventional to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and cyber-warfare) and new approaches for governments to resolve terrorist insurgencies. Among his recent publications is a handbook, coauthored with his ANSER colleague Lt. Colonel Jeffrey Adams (U.S. Army, retired), Protecting Schools and Universities from Terrorism: A Guide for Administrators and Teachers, published in September 2003 by the American Society for Industrial Security. Joshua Sinai obtained his M.A. and Ph.D. from the Political Science Department at Columbia University.

The aim of this article is to provoke consideration of a new way to conceptualize al-Qaeda’s intentions and plans to conduct catastrophic warfare against the United States, its allies, and other threatened nations around the world. In response to the horrific attacks of 11 September 2001, follow-on attacks in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, and several thwarted plots in Europe, anticipating and preventing future attacks by al-Qaeda and its affiliated terrorist groupings have become first-order national security priorities for many of the world’s intelligence and law enforcement communities. Such analysis is also required in the nongovernmental, open-source communities as well. Although it is difficult to predict the likelihood of every major attack by a group such as al-Qaeda, because terrorist groups have the advantage of striking at a time and location of their choosing, there already exists a wealth of diagnostically predictive indicators pointing to the next waves of catastrophic attacks by a group such as al-Qaeda and its network of terrorist allies.

This article outlines seven predictive attack indicators to forecast catastrophic terrorism. Political leaders, policy planners, and military, intelligence, and law enforcement operators at all levels will greatly improve their capabilities to respond to the terrorist challenge if they operationalize these predictive indicators against al-Qaeda’s historic and potential strategies, tactics, and targeting. Such “red-teaming” of a terrorist group’s warfare potential is similar to the way military commanders play adversary forces (the “red teams”) against their own forces (the “blue teams”).

Building a robust predictive capability to anticipate and preemptively prevent attacks by groups such as al-Qaeda now is more important than ever because of their determination to inflict catastrophic damage upon their adversaries. As demonstrated by the suicide attacks against Australian and British tourists in Bali, Indonesia; Israeli tourists in Mombassa, Kenya (where an additional 250 Israeli lives could have been lost had the Arkia airliner been hit by the shoulder-fired rocket); and the large residential complex in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, housing American and other foreign families; as well as a suicide attack by two British al-Qaeda operatives on a popular seaside bar in Tel Aviv; al-Qaeda is as determined as ever to demonstrate its viability as the world’s most lethal terrorist group.

The catastrophic attacks of 11 September and the follow-on poisonous anthrax letter campaign (which reportedly was not carried out by al-Qaeda) have ushered in a new terrorist warfare paradigm in which attacks against the United States and its allies have vastly escalated in the lethality of their weaponry and targeting. The threshold from “conventional” low-impact terrorist warfare has been crossed, as demonstrated by the horrific attacks against the World Trade Center and news reports about interest in acquiring or actual experimentation by al-Qaeda in chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear devices and weapons—however crude and low tech. As a consequence of these factors, the new means of terrorist attacks we are likely to face will involve not only such weapons of mass destruction and disruption but conventional means to attack critical infrastructural targets such as nuclear and chemical plants, agricultural nodes such as livestock feeding centers, and the heart of the American and world economy—such as the New York Stock Exchange—with catastrophic human and economic consequences. Usama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda terrorist network and its satellite affiliates are the most likely groups to carry out such catastrophic attacks because of their intent—a virulent hatred of their adversaries—capability, and resources.

As the top leaders, members of sleeper and active cells, and other operatives of al-Qaeda and its allies are being arrested or killed in their former centers of gravity in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other parts of the world (reportedly, some 3,000 operatives, forming one-third to one-half of the group’s upper and lower echelons, have been eliminated as active terrorists), there still undoubtedly remain hundreds of new leaders, operatives, and sleeper cells armed with target folders for the next waves of catastrophic terrorist operations. The U.S.-led overthrow of al-Qaeda’s Taliban allies in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, as well as holding Taliban and al-Qaeda operatives in detention centers such as Guantanamo Bay, cumulatively are likely to serve as major triggers for their remaining operatives to seek catastrophic revenge on behalf of their fallen, retreating, or arrested comrades.

To forecast the next waves of likely catastrophic terrorist attacks, this analysis uses a methodology based on seven predictive attack indicators, generated from al-Qaeda’s mindset, modus operandi, and target selection based on its training handbook (available on the Department of Justice website); public statements by bin Laden and his associates that have been broadcast on television news programs; and the extensive media reporting of the group’s previous failed attacks and plots (as outlined in captured documents), which often serve as blueprints for its future targeting.

To anticipate, preempt, and deter future catastrophic attacks, the following methodology employing seven predictive attack indicators can be operationalized to forecast the next waves of al-Qaeda terrorist operations, as outlined in the following threat matrix.

Methodology to Forecast Catastrophic Terrorism Against the U.S. Homeland

Indications and Warning Indicators and Observables Preceding the 11 September 2001 Attacks

Attack indicator #1: Previous terrorist attacks, failed attacks, or plots not yet executed, which serve as blueprints for intentions and future targeting

Al-Qaeda and its allies have carried out numerous successful attacks since the early 1990s; however, they also have experienced quite a few significant failed attacks. In other cases, some plots have never been executed. Synthesizing the lessons learned from a group’s successful attacks, failed attacks, and plots can generate insight into its future intentions and capabilities. Plots, for example, can be uncovered by covertly penetrating a group, capturing its documents, or interrogating its apprehended operatives. In the case of al-Qaeda, much insight into its warfare proclivity can be gained by examining its training manual, which spells out missions that include destroying a nation’s foreign embassies, critical infrastructure nodes (such as vital economic sectors and bridges), and even places of amusement (because they are considered sinful).

Underlying the first predictive indicator are some of the following historical observables and actions:

• The February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center towers. This attack resulted in extensive property damage and some loss of life but failed to bring down the towers. The bombing was intended to be accompanied by the bombing of several other targets in New York City, such as the Empire State Building, the Holland Tunnel, and United Nations headquarters.
• In December 1994, an al-Qaeda affiliate, the Algerian Armed Islamic Group, hijacked an Air France Airbus with 171 passengers aboard, intending to plunge it into the Eiffel Tower. None of the hijackers could fly the aircraft to its intended target, so, instead, the plane landed in Marseilles, where French police stormed it.
• In the mid-1990s, Ramzi Yousef, the mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, while in the Philippines, plotted to blow up 11 U.S. airliners and, in a separate plot, fly planes filled with explosives into the CIA headquarters in Langley, VA, and nuclear facilities elsewhere in the United States.
• In December 1999, an al-Qaeda affiliate was involved in a foiled plot to bomb Los Angeles International Airport. At the same time, al-Qaeda operatives were foiled by Jordanian security authorities in their attempt to blow up tourist sites in Jordan, and internal hurdles prevented them from bombing the U.S.S. Sullivans in the Yemeni port of Aden.
• On 8 September 2001, two al-Qaeda operatives pretending to be journalists assassinated Northern Alliance commander General Ahmed Shah Masoud at his Afghanistan base by detonating a bomb concealed in their video camera.
• The airplane that ultimately crashed into the Pentagon during the 11 September hijackings reportedly also targeted the U.S. Capitol and the White House. The fourth airplane, which crashed in a Pennsylvania field, reportedly was unable to crash into the U.S. Capitol or the White House, or, in another published although unconfirmed scenario, was en route to crash into a nuclear facility.
• Al-Qaeda operatives had planned to hijack airplanes in Britain and crash them into the Houses of Parliament and London’s Tower Bridge.

Operationalizing attack indicator #1 yields this forecasting assessment: the 11 September bombing of the World Trade Center signifies that when al-Qaeda fails in its initial mission (in this case, the abortive 1993 attack), it is likely to return—whatever length of time is required to prepare for the next mission—to complete that objective. It can be surmised, therefore, that al-Qaeda operatives are likely to persist in their objective of attacking the following that are part of their target folder (all information is entirely speculative): the Holland Tunnel, the Empire State Building, United Nations headquarters, the Eiffel Tower, the CIA headquarters, the U.S. Capitol, the White House, and nuclear power facilities. In addition, Disney World amusement parks are likely targets. In Britain, the Houses of Parliament and the Tower Bridge, which reportedly were contemplated by al-Qaeda as part of their 11 September worldwide attack repertoire, are still likely to remain at the top of al-Qaeda’s ranking of trophy targets.

In addition, the September 2001 assassination of General Masoud by operatives in disguise and several attempts since then to assassinate members of the current Afghan leadership portend continuous efforts by al-Qaeda operatives and their allies to assassinate leaders of their adversaries. Of particular concern are likely efforts by these terrorist operatives to carry out their assassination attempts in disguise or to use operatives who do not fit regular profile attributes in order to evade possible detection.

Attack indicator #2: A terrorist group’s modus operandi, especially tactics

Al-Qaeda’s modus operandi, as demonstrated by the 11 September attacks and outlined in its training manual, involves meticulous planning, training, and precisely timed simultaneous execution. Such warfare capability is attained through extensive training and operational and tactical innovations.

Based on its modus operandi, publicly announced intentions, and previous actions, al-Qaeda’s future attacks will likely involve some of the following tactics:

• Truck bomb attacks on the ground or using aerial or maritime delivery means, such as miniature submarines or shipborne containers, to transport chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear devices to a targeted site.
• Driving a truck loaded with a hazardous-material explosives against a prominent target, such as a tunnel, bridge, or busy downtown area.
• Detonating a radioactive dispersal device (a “dirty” bomb) near a nuclear power facility or a major financial center, such as the New York Stock Exchange.

Attack indicator #3: Use of particular types of weapons and devices that a terrorist group perceives will achieve its objectives

The simultaneous suicide bombing attacks of 11 September portend that the next phase will likely involve even more catastrophic assaults, with each successive plot employing highly innovative and deadlier weapons and devices to inflict maximum casualties and physical damage.

Current news reporting is filled with discussions of possible chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attacks by al-Qaeda operatives. Such speculation is not without foundation. Bin Laden’s Afghan training camps taught skills for using weapons of mass destruction—such as feeding poison gas through the air vents of office buildings. Other reports claimed that bin Laden’s operatives tried to obtain uranium from the former Soviet republics but instead were given low-grade reactor fuel and radioactive garbage. Also possible, in this catastrophic scenario, are attacks that would use conventional or unconventional explosives against a nuclear power plant or chemical facility.

A chemical attack could be carried out by a crop-dusting plane spraying sections of a city. One of al-Qaeda’s operatives who was involved in the 11 September attacks reportedly had in his possession a manual for operating crop-dusting equipment, so such an attack should not be discounted.

Another worst-case scenario might involve al-Qaeda operatives crashing a truck into the New York Stock Exchange building (which reportedly has inadequate perimeter defenses) to detonate a dirty bomb mixed with conventional and radioactive materials. Such an attack would render the stock exchange and its immediate surroundings inactive for weeks, setting off temporary worldwide economic turmoil—although this might be offset by the backup computer data storage systems located elsewhere.

The London Stock Exchange, which has already been contemplated as a target by al-Qaeda, represents another likely trophy target, also with potentially devastating economic consequences worldwide.

Based on al-Qaeda’s intention to inflict maximum economic damage, another worst-case scenario involves a biological agent attack against a U.S. agricultural sector, which would produce an impact similar to that of the foot-and-mouth outbreak that devastated British agriculture. Such an attack would also severely impact the U.S. and worldwide commodities trading market. Similarly, a terrorist-induced outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome would devastate a region’s tourism or export industries.

Attack indicator #4: The objectives of a group’s state sponsor

State sponsors are crucial to terrorist groups engaging in catastrophic warfare because the resources of a state can be helpful in so many ways. Afghanistan’s Taliban rulers provided bin Laden and al-Qaeda with a safe haven. Saddam’s regime in Iraq, until its overthrow, may have provided the group with some degree of support because of the convergence of their objectives, particularly in taking revenge against the United States. According to press reports, terrorists have been trained at Iraqi camps in chemical and biological warfare and in flying commercial aircraft. Press reports also indicated that an al-Qaeda operative, Muhammad Ataf, met an Iraqi intelligence official in Prague several times. Iran now is reported to provide al-Qaeda with logistical and other forms of support, including collaboration with Iran’s terrorist proxy, the Lebanese Hizballah.

Although there may be few apparent smoking guns, it is reasonable to assume that al-Qaeda is interested in obtaining the support of Iran’s radical clerical leaders in mounting its catastrophic warfare against their common adversaries. Such state support would provide al-Qaeda with access to certain types of weapons of mass destruction that would be difficult for the group to obtain on its own.

Attack indicator #5: The geographic factor

The geographic factor is a crucial predictive indicator because it pinpoints a group’s operational center of gravity and logistical capability to reach, conduct surveillance of, and attack its adversary. Al Qaeda is the umbrella organization of an international network of like-minded groups with hundreds of cells around the world. These groups operate as planets in al-Qaeda’s solar system, which makes them highly dangerous because they already possess the infrastructure to carry out terrorist attacks in any part of the world, as demonstrated by their capability to carry out attacks with relative ease in dispersed countries such the Philippines, Pakistan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Morocco, and Kenya, with reported sleeper cells in Western countries such as Britain, Spain, and the United States. Already, al-Qaeda operatives have carried out or attempted to carry out attacks against American targets in these countries, including a thwarted attempt by an al-Qaeda cell to attack American and British warships in the Strait of Gibraltar.

Moreover, al-Qaeda has expanded its geographic target folder to include Israel, as demonstrated by its successful attack in Kenya against Israeli tourists and the near-miss attack against the Israeli airliner. In fact, in May 2003, two British nationals allegedly affiliated with al-Qaeda traveled to Israel to carry out a suicide bombing of a popular bar in Tel Aviv.

Based on this predictive indicator, potential regions to be targeted by al-Qaeda are likely to range from the United States to foreign lands, especially those where the United States maintains facilities that represent significant trophy targets, such as military bases or symbols of America’s economy—a fast food restaurant chain, a hotel chain, a cruise liner, or car dealerships.

Attack indicator #6: Historical dates of particular significance to terrorist groups

Terrorist groups, particularly religious groups, place a high premium on historical dates that are significant to their religion or their religio-ethnic community. Other types of historical dates, such as politically or militarily traumatic events, are also significant. 11 September may have been especially significant because the conspirators who carried out the 1998 African embassy bombings were to be sentenced the following day for their crimes. During that period, the conspirators were in a holding cell at a courthouse in downtown Manhattan near the World Trade Center, which fact may have propelled the terrorists to attack on the preceding day.

Other significant historical dates that are likely to trigger future al-Qaeda attacks are

• 17 January (the commencement of Operation Desert Storm)
• 19 March (Jerusalem Day proclaimed by Ayatollah Khomeini to demand the “liberation” of Jerusalem)
• 30 March (referred to by Israeli Arabs as “Land Day,” it features protests against alleged expropriation of Arab property)
• 7 May (Israeli independence day)
• 31 May (the annual pilgrimage in Mecca begins)
• 5 June (the beginning of the 1967 Six Day War between Israel and her Arab neighbors)
• 4 July (U.S. Independence Day)
• 31 December–1 January (New Year’s Day)

Attack indicator #7: Triggers that propel a group to launch attacks in a revenge mode as quickly as possible ahead of a previous timeline

A spectrum of triggers propels terrorist groups to hasten the timing of terrorist attacks, usually resulting from sudden developments, such as a severe military setback. For example, al-Qaeda’s conspiracy for the 11 September attacks began some two years prior to the attacks, but 12 September may have served as a trigger for the attacks to occur on the previous day.

New and devastating al-Qaeda attacks are likely to be triggered in response to its recent military defeats, particularly in Afghanistan, the detention of their captured operatives in centers at Guantanamo Bay and other areas, the overthrow of their previous state sponsors in Afghanistan and Iraq, and other factors.

Conclusions

The 11 September attacks and follow-on operations are part of al-Qaeda’s asymmetric warfare against the United States and its allies, in which small, fanatically dedicated teams are employed to inflict maximum psychological and physical damage on their much more powerful adversaries.

Terrorist attacks by groups such as al-Qaeda are intended to be catastrophic in terms of human and physical damage in order to punish and send a strong political message to the targeted adversary and to the group’s constituents that the group is a world-class destroyer and political force to be reckoned with. In response, the United States, Britain, and their allies have greatly upgraded their intelligence, situational awareness, and defensive, preemptive, and deterrence postures.

Failing to anticipate the 11 September horrific attacks represented more than a failure of intelligence—it was a failure of imagination. Previously, such attacks were viewed as too grandiose and farfetched to be taken serious by intelligence and law enforcement authorities. Now these attacks, the attacks that have been thwarted, and other plots are perceived as likely blueprints for future catastrophic terrorist operations against the United States and its allies.

Security and risk assessment professionals must always adopt proactive measures to anticipate, defend against, and preempt new types of terrorist threats. Moreover, one should not expect past trends to necessarily reveal future attack patterns because terrorists, especially al-Qaeda planners, always seek to exploit new vulnerabilities and new and innovative modes of warfare in order to evade detection and inflict maximum damage. Therefore, to avert catastrophic attacks that previously were considered beyond the imagination of those responsible for security, we need to begin thinking like the terrorist enemy—always anticipating and preparing to counteract new types of attacks and targeting potentialities. Continuous red-teaming is required, using outside-the-box threat and risk assessments and the most advanced (yet user-friendly) computerized predictive analytic tool kits. Such red-teaming must focus on multidimensional, not unidimensional, baskets of potential threats. Above all, emphasis must be placed on intelligence tracking of suspected terrorist networks, cells, and operatives; detection; and, above all, preemption during the earliest possible pre-attack incubatory phases.

Within this context, this threat assessment is intended to provide some of the initial conceptual means to anticipate and prevent catastrophic terrorist attacks, such as those that occurred on 11 September, from occurring again.

Joshua Sinai may be reached at joshua.sinai@anser.org.